During the pre-emptive strikes by the PAF on Indian airfields on 3rd December 1971, they targeted Jodhpur, but not Jaisalmer.
PAF seemed to believe there were no fighter aircraft based at Jaisalmer, so there was no need to spend any effort on neutralising that. Their Army also thought so.?
In doing that, they overlooked the basic principle of Air Power, which is, ¡®Speed¡¯.
Just how long does it take for airplanes to deploy? Barely hours! Didn¡¯t the Pakistani commanders know that? Why didn¡¯t the PAF bosses advise their Army counterparts?
Another possibility is, since they planned to - dreamed of would be a better phrase, as it was so overly ambitious - capture Jaisalmer in just one day, maybe they wanted the airfield intact for their use.
Some publications report the extent of Pakistani planners¡¯ bravado in the quote of an unnamed General, ¡°Breakfast at Longewala, lunch at Ramgarh and dinner at Jaisalmer!¡±?
Apparently, only on 2nd December 1971 did the Pakistan Army share with the Pakistan Air Force their plan to launch this offensive on the night of 4th December. The PAF told them they could not provide any air cover because they were not told in advance.
That¡¯s bureaucracy at its best!
Your country¡¯s strategic plan demands the capture of large Indian territory to use as a bargaining chip after ceasefire, and the Air Force cannot deploy to nearby bases and provide air cover, despite a notice of two days?
Since the plan was vital to Pakistan¡¯s ¡®national interest¡¯, the Army decided to attack without air cover, forgetting the basic tenet learnt since World War II, ¡°He who controls the air, controls everything on the surface below.¡±?
I cannot understand, was this unpardonable ignorance or unparalleled arrogance?
Contrast this with the efforts of the IAF to gain Air Superiority in East Pakistan, so that our Army could advance quickly.?
Jaisalmer was a forward base of the IAF, with minimal resources and personnel, to maintain the airfield ready for operations.?
Just before the war, we moved four Hunter aircraft there, for air defence or ground attack, when required.?
As everyone knows - or should know - Air Power is inherently flexible.?
It takes mere minutes to change an airplane¡¯s weaponry to switch from Air Defence to Ground Attack role.
Pakistan Army had a force of some 2500 men with 40 battle tanks, against 120 Indian soldiers with just one anti-tank cannon.
While on paper, this ratio appears overwhelmingly favourable to Pakistan, they ignored Air Power, which could - and did - tilt the scales.
Our Army soldiers bravely held their defensive position through the night of 4th December, after having asked for air support from the IAF.
Much has been said about the inability of the IAF to fight at night.?
The technology in 1971 simply did not permit night attacks. Certainly not on tanks spread across a dark desert and definitely not against enemy troops in close combat with ours. What if a bomb missed the enemy and harmed our own?
At dawn on 5th December, our Hunter aircraft, which were armed and readied during the night, took off and arrived over the battlefield.
The pilots of Army¡¯s Air Observation Post (meant to direct our artillery fire) flying a small Krishak airplane, took on the role of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) and guided our fighters.
Armed with rockets and 30mm cannon, the Hunter aircraft dived again and again, picking out Pakistani tanks that had nowhere to hide.?
There were only four fighter planes in Jaisalmer, but they refuelled, rearmed and returned at such regularity that Pakistani intruders had no respite through the day.?
Our pilots, facing absolutely no opposition either from PAF fighters or from the Air Defence guns, merrily executed what one of them later described as a ¡®turkey shoot.¡¯
That, the Pakistani tanks carried extra fuel in external cans (to drive non-stop to Jaisalmer), literally added fuel to the fire!
Their tanks and other vehicles turned and scampered to avoid being set ablaze by the deadly fire from our aircraft, but the Hunter aircraft still hunted them.?
The excellent synergy between the Indian Army and Air Force resulted in a loss of 2 Indian soldiers in return for some 200 Pakistani soldiers, 34 tanks and over 100 vehicles.
That day we intercepted a Pakistani message, which said:
¡°The enemy air force has been creating havoc. One aircraft leaves, and another comes and stays overhead for twenty minutes. Forty per cent troops and tanks have been destroyed, injured or damaged. Further advance has become very difficult. Send Air Force for help as soon as possible otherwise even a safe withdrawal would be difficult.¡±?
That night, the General Officer Commanding our Army in Rajasthan Sector, sent a personal message to the Base Commander at Jaisalmer. It read:?
¡°We had excellent cooperation and support today. Shooting by your boys had been most accurate, resulting in destroying a number of enemy tanks and blunting the attack. Please convey my appreciation and that of my troops to the pilots. Congratulations on excellent performance.¡±
The distance from Longewala to Jaisalmer could easily be covered, even in war, within a day - on a good day. But a good day can turn into a bad day if you ignore Air Power!?
Pakistan Army¡¯s planned breakfast at Longewala, lunch at Ramgarh and dinner at Jaisalmer turned out to be burnt meals in a blazing oven that not only destroyed their offensive force but also deterred any such foolhardy forays in the future.
That¡¯s the price they paid for forgetting the basic lessons about Air Power from the previous wars.
I have since often been asked, especially after a movie about this, ¡°Who exactly won this battle? The Indian Army or the Air Force?¡±
My answer is simple.?
We, the Indian Army and Air Force, won it together.?
I would have gladly included the Indian Navy too, but couldn¡¯t, because the Ship of the Desert, that¡¯s a camel, differs vastly from the ships at sea!?
But our Navy¡¯s actions in the Arabian Sea may still have had an indirect influence, affecting Pakistani supplies.?
So, let¡¯s rephrase that.
We, the Indian Armed Forces, won it together for the people of India.?
And maybe, even for the people of Bangladesh, for any loss of territory in the West could eventually have been exchanged for the gains in the East at the negotiating table after the war.
This is the sixth in a series covering the major air actions of the 1971 war on the occasion of its 50th Anniversary.?Watch this space.?
The writer is a former fighter pilot of the IAF and now a commercial airline pilot. He is the author of two books and many blog posts, available at?www.avinashchikte.com