The Indian Air Force had drawn up extensive plans to bomb tactical as well as strategic targets deep inside Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil conflict, while the Navy had the Karachi harbour in its cross-hairs.
AFP
But the orders to execute the plans never came from the then NDA government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Instead, the cabinet committee on security on May 25 clearly instructed then IAF chief Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis that his fighter jets must not cross the Line of Control under any circumstances, leave alone undertake deep strikes into Pakistan.
Tipnis, by his own account, did ask for permission for his fighters to slightly cross the LoC for better attack options against the well-fortified positions established by the Pakistan Army regulars on the Kargil heights after intruding into Indian territory in April-May that year.
BCCL
The IAF's request to cross the LoC slightly during the Kargil conflict had been categorically rejected by the then government.
BCCL
This restraint shown by India in not escalating the conflict into a full-blown war, in fact, put tremendous international pressure led by the US on Pakistan to finally withdraw from the Kargil heights.
AFP
IAF's own "offensive air operations" under Operation Safed Sagar, in support of the ongoing Army operations on the ground, began on May 26. But all throughout the conflict, the Indian MiG-21, MiG-27 and Mirage-2000 fighters fired rockets and missiles at the "fortified enemy positions" only from their "own side" of the LoC.
BCCL
While the Kargil conflict was its peak, the Srinagar airbase was put on high alert for a pre-emptive deep strike inside Pakistan at dawn on June 13, as per an NDTV report. The MiG-21 pilots from the "Golden Arrows" squadron were all geared up, with targets being assigned, and equipped with revolvers and Pakistani currency to escape in the eventuality of being shot down over Pakistan or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, as is customary. They had also written "letters home" if they did not return from their missions.