How Heli Bridges Helped Indian Forces Cross Rivers During the 1971 War
Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, is full of rivers and streams that swell up during the monsoons. Which is why General (Later Field Marshal) Manekshaw convinced the Prime Minister to postpone our military action to later months of the year, for faster movement, to achieve quick results.
Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, is full of rivers and streams that swell up during the monsoons.
Which is why General (Later Field Marshal) Manekshaw convinced the Prime Minister to postpone our military action to later months of the year, for faster movement, to achieve quick results.
But even in December, those rivers and streams posed a challenge, more so because the Pakistani Army had blown up some 500 bridges and fortified their positions around the others.
Our Army Engineers have the equipment and the expertise to build bridges under harsh conditions during a war, but that takes time, and makes our crossing point obvious to the opposition, giving them the time and the opportunity to build up defences.
The bigger rivers in Bangladesh - Padma, Brahmaputra and Meghna - are unusually wide, so building bridges across them in a hurry is almost impossible.
Crossing the rivers by boats is not a happy option, because the boats are easy targets as they are slow, take time to cross, cannot hide during the crossing, and would have a concentration of personnel on board who cannot disperse when under enemy fire.
So, Air Power offers a great alternative, because of its ability to fly over natural obstacles.
But, Air Power, especially the fighter and transport planes, need runways and supporting infrastructure, which is static, hence can be attacked and neutralised.
So, a helicopter stands out as an extraordinarily versatile vehicle that can take off and land vertically, does not require huge infrastructure and can operate almost anywhere.
But helicopters are most vulnerable.
Fighter planes are fast and nimble, so are tough targets for ground fire. Transport planes can fly high, above and outside the range of Air Defence guns.
But helicopters are slow and noisy, so can be easily seen and targeted.
Yet, in a bold move, our Army and Air Force decided to create a Heli-Bridge across the river Meghna.
A Heli-Bridge does not mean a physical bridge carried by a helicopter. It means hopping over the river with men and equipment in minutes.
For that, we had to ensure no interference by the Pakistan Air Force, by attaining Air Superiority in East Pakistan, which the IAF did within the first 72 hours of the war.
Brave Bengali fighters of the Mukti Bahini, who were keen to free their land from the oppression of West Pakistani rulers, also helped us.
They knew the area well, were friendly with the locals, and familiar with the terrain.
A Chetak helicopter went and carried out a recce (short for ¡®reconnaissance¡¯) of the potential landing sites in the areas reported to be without strong Pakistani presence.
Unseen Pakistanis hiding in the greenery fired at it, injuring one of the two pilots. But they still completed the survey of the area.
When they landed back in India, they found the helicopter riddled with bullet holes without even slowing down anywhere in enemy territory.
This starkly exposed the danger our helicopters would face from ground fire when they land in enemy territory, and remain motionless to offload soldiers and equipment.
They did not have any armour plating for protection against enemy bullets, and enemy soldiers with just small weapons could easily damage a stationary helicopter.
Even if we could repair a damaged helicopter quickly, an injured pilot would be hard to replace.
So, their only hope was the cover of darkness.
But helicopters, especially those days, did not have the gadgetry to fly at night.
During the Battle of Longewala, our fighter aircraft could not attack targets at night with any accuracy, but they could at least fly from one place to another at night, because they had the instruments to fly ¡®blind¡¯, that our helicopters didn¡¯t.
Did that deter them? Certainly not.
The only big helicopter India then had was the Mi-4, which could carry 12 to 15 soldiers, but by reducing the fuel, they lifted around 25 soldiers plus 2 tonnes of equipment - unlike the gross overloading shown in a recent movie!
With just 10 to 12 helicopters, our pilots flew incessantly by night to lift 1270 soldiers and 40 tonnes of equipment across River Meghna.
They had to land in unknown terrain, often in almost complete darkness, and frequently under fire from the enemy.
Each time they returned, they found newer bullet holes in their helicopters, which our technical teams quickly patched up.
They thus bypassed the fortified Pakistani garrison across the bridge near Ashuganj, saving time and lives on both sides.
We repeated similar operations through the war, which, after these soldiers joined up with our para-dropped troops at Tangail, hastened the fall of Dhaka. Details of the para-drop operation in the next article.
With inputs from Air Commodore RM Sridharan who, as a Flying Officer, was the youngest pilot to participate in those missions.
This is the seventh in a series covering the major air actions of the 1971 war on the occasion of its 50th Anniversary. Watch this space.
The writer is a former fighter pilot of the IAF and now a commercial airline pilot. He is the author of two books and many blog posts, available at www.avinashchikte.com