Five Reasons Why Erdogan Was Able To Retain Presidency Despite Unfavorable Pre-Poll Reports

Turkey¡¯s Sunday election results were received as ¡°unexpected and surprise¡± for the opposition and the Western media, where a tough battle and a run-off on 8 July was considered very certain. The result, however, ended the uncertainty and given Erdogan a comfortable victory in the first round itself. The opposition despite having performed very well and having demonstrated huge public rallies, the vote share remained unchanged from the previous vote patterns.

What went wrong with the opposition can be summarised in five main points:

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1. An underprepared Opposition

The opposition coalition, with three parties secular CHP, nationalist IYI (Good Paty) and Islamist Sadet Party, failed to divide the pro-Erdogan vote. In fact, a criss-cross vote pattern had helped the AKP. There were five trends: First, those who wanted Erdogan and his party in power, their vote share didn¡¯t change. Second, There are at least 10% voters who voted for Erdogan but didn¡¯t vote for his party have come from the opposition party¡¯s camps. Third, Those who wanted Muharram Ince as their president but didn't vote for his party are also nearly 9 %. Then the MHP¡¯s splinter group and the coalition partner of the opposition, the Good Party spoiled the calculation of the main opposition party CHP. The Good Party¡¯s presidential candidate received 7% votes but her party received 10 per cent vote, which apparently switched from the CHP¡¯s support base. The Islamist Sadat Party¡¯s leader didn¡¯t get even one per cent of the vote, not his party secured two per cent. Apparently, their traditional 2-3 per cent vote has also switched to somewhere, to Erdogan potentially as the party¡¯s internal opposition suggests.

The biggest spoiler was the historical higher turn out of 87%. How much the opposition was prepared such criss-cross voting possibility and for the higher turn out is clear from the exact vote share for each party. All that the opposition was best prepared was the second round. Why would an ordinary citizen change his and her vote from first round to second round if he wanted just one option and one round?

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Turkey does not have "anti-refugee populism¡± as the nationalist the Good Party and the CHP candidate Muharram Ince tried to create. Instead, it may have pro-refugee populism which has worked in favour of Erdogan. Historically, Turkey is a country of different ethnicities who had arrived in Turkey from different parts of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe. Syria has been part of their pre-nation-state solidarity because of cross-border ethnic movement, Islam, Ottoman past and marriages. To demonise the Syrian people in a Western capital and in Istanbul are of two different historical contexts, the secular and nationalist elites might have ignored.

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2. Too much focus on Erdogan

Too much focus on Erdogan had become a trap which might have worked in Erdogan's favour. The Western media¡¯s hostility against Erdogan¡¯s personality might have been the main source of opposition¡¯s anti-Erdogan narrative. But Erdogan¡¯s organisational skills, his ability to operate a successful political party is often undermined. Erdogan is not Assad, Hosni Mubarak or Putin, who have ruled their countries with iron hands and sham elections. Turkey had no problem in strong man leadership of Ataturk why would it have with Erdogan now. By overemphasising on Erdogan, the opposition couldn't introduce their own alternative agenda on country¡¯s economy and foreign policy.

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3. 'Democracy In Danger' didn't work

The narrative "Democracy is in danger" in Turkey, was saleable in the West but not for the Turk voters who voted for economic stability and continuity. "Democracy is in danger¡± didn't work in the US and many European countries where right-wing populism prevailed. In Turkey, where elections have taken place in the presence of international observers, mostly in fair and transparent manner didn¡¯t appeal the voters.

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4. Middle class voted in huge numbers

The Middle Class benefitted from Erdogan's 15 years rule is very big and the current crisis is not taken as a permanent crisis rather a temporary phase. In the entire Anatolia and the Black Sea districts Erdogan has received above 60%. These are the districts where Erdogan¡¯s fifteen-year rule has brought significant transformation. Now the urban centres like Istanbul, the largest number of Parliament seats are elected by Istanbul, as well, have voted above 50% to Erdogan. The opposition¡¯s failure to win over the distant and peripheries in Turkey is so evident even in the Kurdish majority districts of the south-east where Erdogan and his party has received nearly 35-40 per cent vote while Muharram Ince secured only 5-10 per cent. The Kurdish party HDP has indeed maintained its grip over the region by securing more than 50% in most of the Kurdish districts.

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5. AKP got Kurdish votes

The coalition strategy didn't work for both Erdogan¡¯s party and the CHP. For the presidential election, the CHP was overconfident of its candidate, and the smaller parties were more keen in entering the parliament than to win against Erdogan. Had they found a joint candidate, voters would have only two options, instead of six. This is the first time that Turkey has allowed pre-election alliance. As a result, the threshold limit of 10 per cent to get a seat in the parliament has been addressed. But the Good Party has managed to reach the threshold which means the party will be acting more independently from its coalition partner. But Erdogan¡¯s AKP will be in need for its coalition partner MHP and will be forced for conciliatory politics for many of its decisions in the parliament.

Also, the victory of the main Kurdish party HDP is significant for Turkey¡¯s vibrant democracy where the party will have another opportunity to redress the Kurdish issues through the political process and disassociate itself from the militant groups including the PKK. As the AKP and HDP are the main receivers of Kurdish votes, they have an opportunity to find a common understanding towards restarting the failed peace process.

Dr Omair Anas is an Assistant Professor at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, Turkey.

The opinions expressed in the article are the personal opinions of the author.