Maldives just hit the news headlines in India and social media outlets for a different reason other than that of Bollywood celebrities vacationing in this beautiful archipelago. This time, the election of President Mohamed Muizzu of the People¡¯s National Congress in the Maldives has started on a wrong note with New Delhi, as the newly elected leader promised to fulfil his campaign promise to remove Indian military personnel from the island nation. Rallying behind what he called ¡°the will of its citizens¡±, he has opened a new yet familiar chapter for India¡¯s strategy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).?
At the heart of India¡¯s dilemma in its immediate neighbourhood, lies a problem of twin asymmetry. While India¡¯s smaller neighbours encounter an asymmetry vis-¨¤-vis India¡¯s geographical size, its political, cultural and economic influence, New Delhi also faces the challenge of dealing with the asymmetry that exist between itself and China¡¯s ability to provide material benefits to South Asian countries that desire both developmental aid as well as security assistance.?
In fact, one of India¡¯s primary foreign policy challenges is to navigate its neighbours¡¯ ability to hedge their bets between New Delhi and Beijing. As the outcome of the election in Maldives, portend a pro-China tilt, the near future will see both Male and New Delhi navigating a complex minefield of public rhetoric and more private diplomatic elbowing.?
Giving a rather measured response to President Muizzu¡¯s statement on India¡¯s military presence in Maldives, India¡¯s Ministry of External Affairs had commented that New Delhi looked forward to ¡°engaging with the new administration in Maldives on all such issues.¡±
India is undoubtedly a potent electoral issue in its neighbouring countries and owing to its overwhelming pre-eminence in the region; India becomes an easy target for any candidate running a campaign to bolster sovereignty and an independent foreign policy.?
However, the call for distance from New Delhi often amounts to Beijing eating up India¡¯s strategic space. The seesaw from an ¡®India First¡¯ strategy during the Ibrahim Mohammed Solih government to the ¡®India Out¡¯ campaign of the current political dispensation is evident now. Muizzi¡¯s moves are not surprising; given the direction, that former President Abdullah Yameen of the People¡¯s National Congress had earlier taken, bringing Maldives into a closer embrace with China.?
However, the ball is now in Male¡¯s court, as to how the current administration pragmatically comes out of the campaign mood, and understand the larger geopolitics and imperative for a stable regional architecture in the IOR that earlier guided the Solih administration and New Delhi to forge closer ties covering both military and non-military affairs.?
The India-Maldives cooperation has been significant in the areas of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), as well as in critical areas of climate change mitigation and infusing accountability in infrastructure building in the region.?
Maldives¡¯s geostrategic location endows it with both security and economic importance in the IOR as well as the larger conception of the Indo-Pacific. China¡¯s rising ambition in the IOR, should be a concern to all those who care about a rules based order in the Indo-Pacific. While smaller countries like Maldives in need of development partners, might find it prudent to welcome Beijing¡¯s overtures, multilateral stakeholders such as the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) between India, the U.S., Japan and Australia or sub-regional platforms like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) needs to create alternative pathways.
Male¡¯s foreign policy orientation under Muizzu will put New Delhi into a familiar conundrum of trying to affect favourable outcomes while underplaying its image of a ¡°big brother¡± in its neighbourhood. As in many other South Asian countries, China¡¯s ability to create incentives for Maldives to depend on Beijing¡¯s economic largesse not only eats into India¡¯s strategic space but also create more roadblocks for effective multilateralism in the region.?
This will not be the first time New Delhi has had to manoeuvre such developments in its neighbourhood; neither will it be the last one.? Shaping and reshaping relationships with its immediate neighbours, ranging from outright hostility to complex balancing like the one seen in Maldives, will be the test of India¡¯s foreign policy toolkit. India has to navigate not only intra-subcontinental dynamics but also the involvement of extra-regional players that are either adversarial or friendly.?
Therefore, New Delhi¡¯s handling of its immediate neighbourhood would require creating common grounds of vision and operation with like-minded stakeholders of a stable Indo-Pacific, and those partners that are equally interested in creating a common destiny of growth in the IOR.?
In the final analysis, New Delhi would require to build political convergences in the neighbourhood, cutting across party lines that would safeguard its goodwill and help maintain a sustainable partnership irrespective of the changing political winds in those countries.?
The Author is a Strategic Analyst based in India and the Honorary Director of the Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies (KIIPS). He is a regular commentator on International Affairs and India¡¯s Foreign Policy.